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Abstract
Throughout much of the history of Western philosophy, the works of non-Western philosophers were often
categorized as belonging to that of mystics and was not worthy of rational discourse. This attitude began to
change in the mid-19th century with philosophers such as Arthur Schopenhaur, but even more so in the 20th
century as exploration of Eastern philosophy began in full earnest. Of particular note is Martin Heidegger’s
examination of Buddhism in his phenomenological work. Heidegger is not the only phenomenologist to have
connections to Buddhism. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the leading French phenomenologist of the 20th century,
argued that the body was not only necessary for experiencing the world, but also for the attainment of
authentic self-hood. In a similar vein, centuries earlier, the Zen master Dogen was formulating a philosophy of
the body that closely corresponds with what Merleau-Ponty discusses in his seminal work The Phenomenology
of Perception by claiming that the body was the necessary component of attainment of enlightenment through
its practice of zazen, or seated meditation. Drawing from these two philosophers, and contemporary
commentators, this paper argues that the divide between philosophy in the East and West is not as great as
one might think. By providing a space for dialogue between Dogen and Merleau-Ponty, we see how their
philosophies discourse with one another, especially in regards to their understanding of the body’s
importance in realization of authentic self-hood. And in providing this space, the foundations of a greater
discourse between East and West may begin.
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INTRODUCTION  
The connections between the 
phenomenologists of the twentieth century 
and the thoughts of Buddhist philosophers 
are readily apparent to those who know 
where to look, but what is not so apparent is 
just how deep the connection in fact goes.  It 
is not simply a matter of using witty 
catchphrases and clever word play that binds 
phenomenology as a science to the faith of 
Buddhism, but it is in fact a deep, accurate 
portrayal of Buddhist beliefs to the Western 
world that allows phenomenology to bridge 
the philosophies of the East and West.  The 
works of Merleau-Ponty and Dogen 
(founder of the Soto Zen School) are 
especially important in bridging this gap 
between Western and Eastern philosophical 
discourse because of their focus on the 
necessity of the body in experience.  This 
emphasis of importance on the body by both 
of these philosophers is not merely 
comparable with one another, but the ideas 
expressed are also compatible, and highlight 
the way in which dialogue between Eastern 
and Western philosophy may more 
peaceably and respectfully proceed. 
 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the body is 
necessary for the phenomenological 
experience of reduction, a psychological 
state where we are only examining our 
current, immediate experience for what it 
merely is.  In Dogen’s philosophy of Zen as 
zazen (sitting meditation) we see a parallel 
belief of how the body is used as a vehicle to 
reach enlightenment (there are parallels 
between reduction and enlightenment, as I 
discuss in a moment).  For Dogen, zazen, the 
practice of sitting meditation was not only 
the path to Zen but was in fact Zen itself. 
 
In Buddhism, every sentient being is 
possessed of Buddha-nature—every being is 
a part of every other, all beings are 
ultimately connected, and capable of 
enlightenment.  Essentially, when we break 
everything down far enough one realizes 
that we are ultimately all connected by this 
metaphysical claim. 
 
The phenomenological claim of reduction is 
incredibly similar.  What we see is that 
reduction defines the moment of satori (a 
brief and sudden moment of pure 
understanding that paves the way to full 
enlightenment)—it is, as St. Francis of 
Assisi and modern Zen practitioners would 
say, merely seeing the world in a different 
light and in a different way.  When we 
observe something from the 
phenomenological mindset, the Buddhist 
would argue we are also acting in 
accordance with our Buddha-nature. 
 
In order to fully explore this line of 
reasoning, we must first examine the 
foundations of both Buddha-nature and 
phenomenology as they relate to this essay.  
We will briefly observe the meanings of 
Buddha-nature and reduction before moving 
onto the comparisons between Dogen and 
Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the body.  
Thus, much like our topic, we will proceed 
from the broadest understanding to the much 
more focused and narrow one. 
 
 
BUDDHA-NATURE 
One of the core doctrinal beliefs of Zen 
Buddhism is that of Buddha-nature.  The 
belief in Buddha-nature is the closest belief 
within Buddhism that is analogous a belief 
in the soul.  Like the soul, it is eternal and 
cannot be destroyed.  However, it is not 
necessarily an individually possessed thing 
like a soul—that is, whereas the soul is the 
individual’s own, separate, complete thing, 
the Buddha-nature is not the individual’s 
own thing, for it is what ultimately connects 
the being to all beings by belonging to all 
beings.  The Buddha-nature is not to be 
confused with a soul; it is not a personal, 
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transcendent quality unique to one being, 
but rather a feature of each sentient being 
that is equal in its representation and effect 
(i.e. the capability to achieve 
enlightenment).  “The absolute inclusiveness 
of the Buddha-nature does not imply that it 
is immanent in all existences; rather all 
existences are immanent in it.”1  A classic 
example used by Buddhists to explain 
Buddha-nature is the myth of “Indra’s Net.”  
In this story the god Indra created a great net 
made of fabulous jewels.  Each jewel is 
separate, but reflects the others.  What we 
see in this example is the idea that Buddha-
nature reflects all other sentient beings 
within our selves, thus interconnecting and 
interpenetrating our own selves. Another 
classic tale involves one of the empresses of 
China and a Buddhist monk.  The monk 
took a statue of the Buddha and set it in a 
room full of mirrors.  The mirrors 
represented individual beings, who reflected 
the image of the Buddha statue.  However, 
they also reflected the other mirrors, their 
reflections of the Buddha statue, and the 
reflection of their own selves as reflecting 
the others.  Thus, each being is an 
individual, but is ultimately connected to 
and a part of all other beings. 
 
The importance of such a belief is that 
ultimately, since all sentient beings (which 
in Buddhism compromises humans, animals, 
insects, and divine creatures such as 
bodhisattvas, asuras, and devas) have 
Buddha-nature, all beings are capable of 
attaining enlightenment.  “If the Buddha-
nature is equally present in all, then all are 
equally near Buddhahood.”2  In practice, the 
                                            
1
 Carl Olson,  “The Human Body as a Boundary 
Symbol: A Comparison of Merleau-Ponty and 
Dogen.”  Philosophy East and West, 36 no. 2 (1986): 
116. 
 
2
 Edward Conze, Buddhism: Its Essence and 
Development. (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2003), 
145. 
idea of Buddha-nature was latched onto as a 
means of recognizing the potential for bodhi 
(awakening) and was used as a means of 
expressing compassion to other human 
beings and sentient creatures.  Thus, all 
beings are capable of awakening to 
Buddhahood through their Buddha-nature 
and thus, all beings are capable of 
enlightenment, which is the ultimate goal of 
the compassionate Buddha as expressed in 
the Lotus Sutra. 
 
Soto Zen, which claims 15000 temples and 
has 5 million members,3 was founded by 
Dogen, for whom Buddha-nature is even 
more inclusive than in other Buddhist 
schools.  All things have Buddha-nature, 
including non-animal life (plants, etc) and 
non-living objects (rocks, etc), and the 
universe itself is a being in time.  In 
addition, Buddha-nature is realized in zazen, 
the practice of sitting meditation.  Dogen 
asserts that zazen is Buddha-nature, that 
zazen must be practiced in order to be more 
fully understood. 
 
 
 
PHENOMENOLOGY 
Phenomenology can best be described as the 
philosophical and scientific approach to 
understanding how we experience our 
experiences.  It is the study of experience 
itself.  Phenomenology also attempts to 
show not only how we experience (i.e., the 
experience of experience), but also what that 
experience means to us. 
 
Within phenomenology there is an emphasis 
on the universality of experience—what the 
conditions of experience are in themselves.  
What phenomenology attempts, therefore, is 
                                                                 
 
3
 John M. Koller, Asian Philosophy, (Upper 
Saddle River: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007). 
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not a detached judgment-experience of 
things as they occur (such as what Descartes 
argued—i.e., that we are constantly judging 
our experiences through the faculty of the 
mind alone), but rather that an acceptance of 
things as they are, without judging or ruling 
on the actions of things other than ourselves 
and of things that we ourselves do.  As 
Edmund Husserl, who is widely considered 
to be the founder of the philosophical school 
of phenomenology, would say, the world 
originates in us, and as such, only our own 
consciousness can apprehend the world as it 
is, though as we shall see Merleau-Ponty 
argues that the body is a necessary part of 
this phenomenological experience as well.  
“The transcendental phenomenologist 
reduces the already psychologically purified 
to the transcendental, that most general, 
subjectivity, which makes the world and its 
‘souls,’ and thus confirms them.”4  Where in 
the mindset of Cartesian dualism we can’t 
even trust our own experiences of anything, 
such a position is unacceptable to 
phenomenology and instead we should 
attempt to understand experience simply as 
experience.  This reduction, i.e., 
understanding experience as an experience, 
can therefore be said to be the experiencing 
of the world as it truly is by means of using 
the only thing truly available to us: our own 
selves.  It is the process in which we 
“bracket” off the world and take it for what 
it is.  For Merleau-Ponty, the body is a 
necessary component of this process of 
reduction; our own self is the body. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
4
 Edmund Husserl,  “Phenomenology” in 
Twentieth Century Philosophy, eds. Forrest E. Baird, 
and Walter Kaufman,  (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
2003), 10. 
 
DOGEN, MERLEAU-PONTY 
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
THE BODY 
In both traditional Buddhism and the 
phenomenology of Husserl, there is a 
condemnation of the body.  While 
phenomenology strives to rid itself of 
Cartesian dualism and Buddhism strives to 
be nondualistic so as to not suppose souls 
(i.e., the Buddhist ideal of anatman5) of any 
kind, both can and do fall into the clutches 
of dualistic claims.  We see this in any work 
of Buddhism which argues for the 
renunciation of the body and the material 
world and in the works of Husserl, who 
struggled throughout his life attempting to 
remove this “stain” from his works.  In the 
Soto Zen school of Buddhism, which was 
founded by the Zen Master Dogen, and in 
the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (for 
this essay we will focus on his work 
Phenomenology of Perception), we find the 
opposite: that the body is not simply a 
material thing, but is involved in the 
transcendent experience necessary for us to 
experience the world as it really is. 
 
The body, as traditionally understood 
throughout both Western and Eastern 
thought is simply a material object, much as 
any other material object such as a chair or a 
book or even the world itself.  As such it is 
merely a vessel that the consciousness 
temporarily resides in and has no effect on 
the consciousness itself.  It is not to be 
regarded in a special manner like the mind, 
nor is it to be held in reverence like the 
consciousness.  Some traditions reject the 
body as evil, or corrupted; at the least, all 
who reject the body claim that paying it any 
great attention beyond simple procedures to 
keep it alive prevents the individual from 
                                            
5
 Anatman has been defined as “no-soul,” “non-
being,” and “not-self.”  The Buddhist belief that there 
are no existing souls which carry on eternally, 
unchanging. 
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ascending to a higher understanding of 
reality. 
 
Both Dogen and Merleau-Ponty reject this 
claim; for them, the body is not simply a 
physical entity.  It is not a material object 
among other material objects, important 
only because it holds the consciousness in a 
state of life.  The body is not a vessel that 
holds back enlightenment of a greater 
reality, but is the vehicle to which one melds 
consciousness and body, subjectivity and 
objectivity.  It is dynamic and nondualistic. 
 
For both of these men, the body is more than 
just the individual body parts or their 
collection.  “The body cannot be 
comprehended by measuring its properties, 
the causal relations among its parts, or its 
causal relation to other such entities, nor can 
it be reduced to an object which is sensitive 
to certain stimuli.”6   The body, for Merleau-
Ponty, is my body, it is the body through 
which I experience.  It is a body in which I 
live—it is a lived body.7 My body is 
responsible for my perceptions of the world 
and my consciousness is dependent on those 
perceptions for its understanding of the 
world; Merleau-Ponty goes so far as to 
reject the idea of an independent (from the 
body) consciousness altogether. 
 
“The true Cogito8 does not define the 
subject’s existence in terms of the 
thought he has of existing, and 
furthermore does not convert the 
indubitability of the world into the 
indubitability of the thought about the 
world, nor finally does it replace the 
world itself by the world as meaning.  
On the contrary it recognizes my 
                                            
6
 Olson, 108. 
7
 Ibid., 108. 
8
 Here Merleau-Ponty is referencing Rene 
Descartes (whose philosophy is commonly attacked 
by Merleau-Ponty). 
thought itself as inalienable fact, and 
does away with any kind of idealism 
in revealing me as ‘being-in-the-
world.’”9    
 
Let us highlight what Merleau-Ponty means 
by this with an example.  I have two hands; 
with them I manually manipulate various 
objects in the world (such as the keyboard I 
am using to type this essay).  However, I can 
also touch them together.  My hand touches 
my other hand and thus I experience my self 
by using my self.  My body perceives the 
world, and its perceptions, my perceptions, 
are used by my consciousness to experience 
the world as itself.  I can see my body, I can 
touch my body.  The world is thus both 
experienced by perception and perception is 
from the body which perceives the world.  
Thus, the body is not distinct from the mind.  
This is how we are “beings-in-the-world”: 
we exist in the world and we experience it 
thusly.  Through this experience we discover 
our existing in the world and through the 
world. 
  
Dogen agrees with Merleau-Ponty on the 
body as being a necessary component for the 
world to be experienced.  Dogen expresses 
this in an analogy to sailing a boat.  The boat 
is the body; its various parts are the way in 
which the passenger, who is the 
consciousness, affects the water that the boat 
is moving through.  The boat could not 
move without a will behind it, but the will 
cannot affect the world by itself.  “Even 
though the boat is the sailor’s mode of 
transportation, it is he who makes it a boat 
which becomes a world of the sailor.”10 I 
cannot understand the world beyond the boat 
without experiencing the boat itself, without 
                                            
9
 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice.  “What is 
Phenomenology?”  in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, 
eds. Baird, Forrest E. and Walter Kaufman, 5,  (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 280. 
10
 Olson, 109. 
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acknowledging that the boat is the vessel on 
which my self resides.  This makes it seem 
as if the sailor (mind) is still in control of the 
boat and resides higher than it, but this view 
is incorrect.  On the contrary, the sailor 
cannot exist outside of the boat—without the 
boat, there is no sailor.  The boat is integral 
to the sailor’s existence; what can a sailor 
sail without a boat?11 The body is thus the 
conclusion and answer to the problem of 
how the consciousness experiences the 
world; it is the I perceive and the I 
experience all in one.  By experiencing, it 
perceives and by perceiving, it experiences.  
It may seem that the boat is merely a vessel 
for the man, much as dualism states that the 
body is a vessel for the mind.  However, for 
Dogen this is not the case.  As noted Dogen 
scholar Joan Stambaugh argues in her work 
Impermanence is Buddha-nature, the man 
does not exist apart from the boat.  Body and 
mind are one—the mind makes the body 
more than just an object and the body makes 
the mind more than just a subject.  One is 
necessary to create the other, thus they are 
both object and subject, passive and active. 
 
As shown earlier, the body is a thing that 
can perceive itself as a being by means of its 
senses.  Dogen goes further than Merleau-
Ponty with his argument to “Cast off body 
and mind.”  It was upon hearing this phrase 
from a Ch’an master in China (Zen is the 
pronunciation of the Chinese Ch’an) that 
Dogen is said to have achieved 
enlightenment.  Upon an initial reading of 
the statement “Cast off body and mind,” one 
might suppose that Dogen is going against 
Merleau-Ponty and that we should reject the 
body; this is a classic misunderstanding of 
Dogen.  What he means by this is that we 
should not become attached to either body 
or mind for to do so would be to ignore the 
                                            
11
 For more information, please see Jeeloo Liu’s 
Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to 
Chinese Buddhism, Blackwell Publishing 2006. 
core of Buddhist teachings—that attachment 
to anything is dukkha.  In fact, the Third 
Noble Truth states that in order to end 
dukkha (Pali: “dis-ease,” “suffering”) one 
must end all attachment, any 
greedily/fearfully grasping onto worldly 
things.  Dogen maintains that the body is the 
manifestation of Buddha-nature, which he 
defines as beings and being itself. 
 
“Dogen writes, ‘The Buddha-body is the 
manifesting body, and there is always a 
body manifesting Buddha-nature.’  This 
revealing is at the same time a concealing, 
because Buddha-nature eludes the grasp of 
knowledge.  By the power of the Buddha-
nature to subsume and transcend existence 
and nonexistence, the manifesting of 
Buddha-nature by the body negates the body 
and transcends it.  Thus, to grasp the essence 
of the body truly is intuitively to grasp 
emptiness, the dynamic and creative aspect 
of Buddha-nature.”12  
 
What is expressed here is the idea that the 
body, as the force that perceives the world it 
exists in and interacts with, perceives not 
only the world, but Buddha-nature itself.  It 
can accomplish this because the body is 
Buddha-nature; that is, it is a being (the 
body as object) and being itself (the body as 
subject).  It bridges and eliminates the gap 
found in mind-body dualism, because it is 
both object and subject at the same time, 
both transcendent and immanent at once.  
For Dogen, this realization occurs in zazen, 
the motionless sitting meditation that 
Buddhist monks worldwide are renowned 
for.  For Dogen, the practice of zazen is 
paramount—it follows thusly that the body 
is Buddha-nature, that zazen is the practice 
of enlightenment, and that if the body is 
Buddha-nature, then zazen is Buddha-
nature.  This also leads us to the conclusion 
that since zazen is practiced enlightenment, 
                                            
12
 Olson, 112. 
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zazen is also the way to cast off body and 
mind.  By overcoming our attachment to the 
dualistic idea of mind-body separation (and 
our individual attachments to each), we 
come to realize that zazen is Buddha-nature 
and thus devoid of ego.  All, as the Buddhist 
would say, is emptiness.13 
 
 
RECONCILIATION 
As we have seen, both Dogen and Merleau-
Ponty place great importance on the body as 
a necessary part of experience.  However, 
we also see that there are some tensions 
between the two; the most apparent being 
that Merleau-Ponty does not support 
spiritual claims and what else could Dogen 
be giving us if not a spiritual claim?  While 
it is simple enough to say that they shall 
agree to disagree on these points, it is 
perhaps more enjoyable to exercise one’s 
intellect and try to find some reconciliation 
between the two.  Will this reconciliation be 
perfect and complete?  Most likely not—
such is the nature of disagreements that 
compromises are often lacking of something 
unique and original between the two ideas 
that disagree in the first place.  However, I 
shall attempt to make as complete a 
reconciliation as possible, for it would be a 
shame to the understanding of the 
philosophy of both if one were to come so 
far only to have to feel and think that 
adherence to both is simply impossible 
because it is not as my reconciliation shall 
show. 
  
                                            
13Emptiness is the closest English translation to 
the Sanskrit “sunyata,” the idea that one is not-self, 
or empty of attachment and thus emptiness is the 
Perfection of Wisdom and vice-versa (re The Heart 
Sutra).  For further information, please see Edward 
Conze’s Buddhism: Its Essence and Development, on 
130-131. 
 
Many would argue that phenomenology is 
not concerned with spiritual matters, while a 
religion like Buddhism is.  In the simplistic 
definition of religion, they would be right.  
However, one of the key defining features of 
the twentieth century was the rejection of 
the idea that only religion (especially 
theistic-centered ones) gave us a meaningful 
reason for and of life.  Merleau-Ponty 
himself, however, rejects both the idea that 
only religion can provide a meaningful life 
and that life is meaningful without any sense 
of spirituality.  Instead, Merleau-Ponty 
offers us a substitution when he draws on 
the sublime while rejecting the claim that 
the world is imminent in the subject. 
 
“…[T]here exists a unity of the 
imagination and the understanding and 
a unity of subjects before the object, 
and that, in experiencing the beautiful, 
for example, I am aware of a harmony 
between sensation and concept, 
between myself and others, which is 
itself without any concept….It is no 
longer merely the aesthetic judgment, 
but knowledge too which rests upon 
this art [imagination], an art which 
forms the basis of the unity of 
consciousness and of 
consciousnesses.”14  
 
Thus, there is something more than just 
merely existing that is important to Merleau-
Ponty.  In this harmony that Merleau-Ponty 
describes we see solidarity between persons 
and between the experience and the one who 
experiences.  Merleau-Ponty, however, does 
not limit this sublime feeling to only 
experiences of art and nature—here he is 
arguing that the viewpoint of reduction 
brings about such solidarity.  Throughout his 
works, he refers to phenomenology as being 
the means to view the world with wonder—
experiencing the world phenomenologically 
                                            
14
 Merleau-Ponty, 283. 
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allows the subject to conceive of the world 
via the transcendence of reduction.   
 
What Merleau-Ponty essentially argues for 
is what we now call humanism, a non-
theistic, anthropocentric claim that is often 
seen as a “replacement” religion.  In a 
similar manner, Zen Buddhism is a non-
theistic, philosophical religion that is often 
confused as merely a philosophy.  Merleau-
Ponty may not be a humanist himself nor 
even arguing for humanism, but one can see 
the arguments within his philosophy.  He 
places a great emphasis on the human body, 
on the interplay of human consciousness 
with the body, and on the wonderment that 
phenomenology brings to humans. 
 
In addition to this, Merleau-Ponty 
continually repeats that reduction never 
ends, that there is no thought which 
embraces all thought.15  In a similar manner, 
Dogen argues that zazen doesn’t end when 
one is enlightened.  Enlightenment is a 
practiced condition, just as Buddha-nature, 
time, and the body.  Is the reduction 
therefore a form of enlightenment?  Not 
necessarily, but the parallel thoughts of how 
we should experience the world (reduction 
for Merleau-Ponty, enlightenment for 
Dogen) are certainly similar—also, as a 
practitioner of Zen, Dogen would support 
whatever brought about the enlightenment 
of a person.  Zen Buddhism is well known 
for its belief that whatever brings a person to 
enlightenment is worthy of being 
practiced—to that end, Zen masters will 
occasionally strike, shout at, or otherwise 
behave in an odd manner to disrupt a 
student’s common, unenlightened 
understanding of the world.  Such behavior 
is to get the student to view the world 
                                            
15
 Merleau-Ponty, 281. 
differently, in such a way that helps lead to 
enlightenment.16 
 
Thus we see that ultimately, it doesn’t 
matter if Merleau-Ponty directly states the 
spiritual aspects of his works—it is evident 
in them already.  The sublime ideal of Kant 
that Merleau-Ponty reworks to be the 
reaction to the phenomenological experience 
of reduction is that spiritual nature. 
 
Ultimately, what is important is that both 
Merleau-Ponty and Dogen agree that the 
body is a fundamental and necessary part of 
experience. In recognizing the importance of 
the body, you recognize its limitations and 
the way in which to overcome those 
limitations.  “To be in the world and to be at 
mercy of unseen biological forces of the 
body represents a human limitation.  
Although humans experience their 
incarnation as a limitation, this experience is 
already an overcoming of this limitation.” 
17This overcoming is achieved by Merleau-
Ponty in the wonderment that the 
phenomenological experience brings (which 
is achieved by the body, the necessary 
component of perception) and for Dogen in 
realization that seated meditation (zazen) is 
Buddha-nature, which is the body, time, and 
ultimately, emptiness. 
 
The importance of the connections between 
these two philosophers is not only the ideas 
they present to us, but that they essentially 
reached the same conclusion using different 
ideas to get there.  It is the hope that these 
beginning connections may expand into 
greater ones, much in the same way that 
practiced seated meditation or continually 
experienced phenomena leads us to greater 
truths about our world, our bodies, and our 
very selves. 
                                            
16
 For more on Zen Buddhism and its beliefs, 
please see Alan Watts The Way of Zen, Vintage 1999. 
17
 Olson, 117-118. 
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